This result suggests that skill in drawing relates to the ability to integrate local samples from each fixation into a more robust internal representation. Experts were able to perform this task with smaller samples of the object. First, to test whether artists had a more advanced ability to represent complex shapes, we designed a gaze-contingent moving window task where participants had to classify an object as structurally possible or impossible, while only being able to see a portion of the object centered on the gaze position. In a number of studies, we next investigated how trained draftspersons visually encode and integrate structural information when analyzing an object. This suggests that intensive training in drawing may not affect already well-established perceptual mechanisms, but might affect higher-order processes such as visual analysis of object structure.
#Devil s tuning fork professional#
In a series of studies, we first demonstrated that drawing expertise does not relate to a more veridical perception of the world: professional artists and art students were no better than novices at seeing scenes accurately – at undoing the automatic perceptual mechanisms that ordinarily correct for visual context like shadows and depth (visual constancies). The focus of this thesis has been to explore how this intensive practice has affected visual and memory processes. One factor may simply be practice: artists have often spent thousands of hours making drawings. Though theorized to be produced by the brain, the topology of VS is not topologically equivalent (homeomorphic) with the structure and activity of the brain because, as will be shown, the topology of VS cannot be formed from the topology of the brain without tearing and/or cutting and pasting.ĭrawing accuracy has been extensively studied in children, but very little is known of what would make some adults more accurate in copying objects or scenes than many others. Applying the method of coordinative definition expounded by Hans Reichenbach for determining geometrical and topological properties of physical space (PS), it can be shown that VS fulfills the topological criteria of being a “real” space sui generis.
Instead such properties have been presupposed a priori rather than being established a posteriori by empirical means, perhaps because these properties are self-evident. By contrast the geometrical analysis of VS has taken little cognizance of its topology. Specifically the topological properties of dimensionality, orientability, continuity, and connectivity define “real” space as studied by physics and are the spatial properties that characterize the physical universe as being an integral whole. For that reason distance is a property not preserved in topological space whereas the property of spatial order is preserved. The empirical study of visual space (VS) has centered on determining its geometry, whether it is a perspective projection, flat or curved, Euclidean or non-Euclidean, whereas the topology of space consists of those properties that remain invariant under stretching but not tearing. Thus, the paper offers indirect support for the view that narrow properties of the perceiver’s perceptual system are both necessary and sufficient for amodal perception.
The impossible figure is a picture that depicts an object that we represent to have a three-dimensional shape, even though the figure could not possibly be instantiated in three-dimensions. This paper develops a counter-example to the extended mind thesis about perception based on the perception of an impossible figure. For example, Nöe and Thompson develop a version of the extended mind thesis based on the assertion that the embodied and enactive approach to perception is necessary to account for amodal perception, and that this entails that phenomenal qualities are realized by physical properties of external objects. Some have argued that the view that perceptual experiences represent properties over and above those directly transduced by the sensory modalities such as in amodal perception, will constrain how we should think of the metaphysical issue about what material properties serve as the realizers of those phenomenal experiences.
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